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Abstract 
Mediators are often thought to be more effective if they are unbiased or have no 
preferences over the issue in dispute. In addition, impartiality is a traditional 
feature attributed to the mediator. This study presents comparative analysis of 
small state and great power mediation which highlights a contrary logic. With the 
help of a contingency approach, combined with a model of mediation drawn on 
the theory of ‘cheap talk’, the concept of biased mediation is explored in two 
important avenues. First, it shows that strategies adopted by biased mediators are 
more likely to foster success. Moreover, a mediator with a bias can reduce the 
likelihood of the conflict by providing information on the resolve of the parties. 
Second, it demonstrates that states as members of international community are 
locked in a web of interactions and interests, and therefore biases should be 
expected by adversaries and perceived as a natural feature of mediating state. 
These assumptions are illustrated by two case studies: Algerian mediation in Iran 
Hostage Crisis and United States’ mediation between Israel and Egypt conducted 
by Henry Kissinger. 
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1 Introduction 
“Meditation brings wisdom; lack of mediation leaves ignorance. Know well what leads 
you forward and what hold you back, and choose the path that leads to wisdom.” 
Buddha 
 
In a world as interconnected and interdependent as ours is, the challenge of 
dealing with conflicts peacefully, and learning to interact effectively with other 
human beings, is truly one of the most important challenges we face today. 
However far-fetched this claim may seem to some, there can be no doubt that 
mediation can resolve conflicts, reduce hostilities, and generally allow people, 
organizations and nations to confront the differences peacefully, and at times even 
constructively. Mediation has been, and remains, one of the most significant 
methods of managing conflicts. In the present international environment, the 
opportunities for conflict are multiplied; therefore the need for effective conflict 
management is necessary. Mediation seems to offer a constructive, practical 
method of managing conflicts and helping to establish some sort of regional or 
international order (Bercovitch, 2002: 3-4). 
To appreciate how mediation should best be used, or more specifically, how 
mediators should behave in a conflict we need to understand the nature of the 
disputants and the dynamics of their conflict (Bercovitch and Houston, 2000: 
170). Mediation is very much a matter of influence and interest. Where a mediator 
represents an official government, a regional or international organization, 
mediation can be viewed as a way of extending and enhancing their own 
influence and gaining some value from the conflict. The relationship between 
mediator and disputants is thus, never entirely devoid of political interest. We 
should not think of mediation as motivated solely and exclusively by an 
overriding sense of altruism, and a genuine mutual commitment to conflict 
resolution. To overlook this feature is to miss an important element in the 
dynamics of mediation (Bercovitch, 2002: 9). The mediator wants to affect the 
disputing parties and their attitudes, perceptions and behaviors about the conflict 
and about the mediation. The central questions, then, are about influences and 
interests linked to mediation process. What attributes of the mediator will foster 
success? What strategies and tactics of mediation are likely to be used, when, and 
with what effect (Carnevale and Arad, 1996: 39)?  
1.1 Aims and Questions 
There are several key questions underpinning this study. The general aim of 
this paper is to provide an answer to the central question: Whether biased 
mediation can foster success in resolving conflicts, contrary to general wisdom 
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that mediators are thought to be effective if they are unbiased or have no 
preferences over the issue in dispute? Moreover, whether such mediation is a 
natural consequence of the way international community of states is organized? 
Given that a mediator on the international scene typically intervene because of the 
interests in one or both of the adversaries, or in the particulars of any resolution 
itself, what place does biased mediation have in this context (Smith, 1985: 365)? 
There are number of specific issues, dilemmas and tradeoffs that immediately 
come to mind which this study hopes to explore. Thus, I want to investigate 
whether impartiality should be a desired feature of international mediation, as it is 
a typical image of mediation in most of the theoretical approaches to. In order to 
answer the central research question, this study explores the concept of biased 
mediation, the role of mediator biases and refers to studies, which examines 
factors affecting mediation outcomes and foster success. Adopting contingency 
approach, this study identifies the factors that may influence mediation outcomes 
and mediation behavior, analyzes and assesses their relative importance. 
Theoretical work needs to provide empirical illustration, which this study does. 
The empirical aim of this study is to conduct analysis of two cases of successful 
biased mediation: Algerian mediation in Iranian Hostage Crisis and United States 
mediation between Israel and Egypt performed by Henry Kissinger.  
1.2 Outline of the Study 
 
For the sake of overview, I will end this chapter by outlining the study. The 
overriding concern of this thesis is with a mediator bias and how it contributes to 
mediation effectiveness, or mediation success. Within these parameters, each of 
the chapters raises issues, which will hopefully lead to answer the main research 
question. The study is dived into six chapters. In Chapter One, I have presented 
the aim of the study, the research problem and the argument in brief. Chapter Two 
is a theoretical chapter. Posing questions about mediation is a meaningful exercise 
only when we reach a consensus on how best to define it, and can emphasize its 
specific features. Therefore, Chapter Two highlights the nature of mediation and 
its main characteristics. In Chapter Three, the contingency approach is introduced 
and the main points for departure are identified. This is followed by 
methodological considerations concerning case studies and the outline of material 
used in this study. In Chapter Four, a section concentrating on some determinants 
of mediation success is introduced and followed by a theoretical discussion 
identifying main trends and reflections on biases and partiality mediation. The 
empirical analysis of bias mediation is conducted in Chapter Five. Two case 
studies of small state and great power mediation are analysed in terms of their 
success and partiality. Chapter Six is the concluding chapter, discussing bias in 
mediation in a broader context, referring to the structure of international 
communities as an interdependent system. 
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2 International Mediation: Varieties of 
Mediating Activities and Actors 
2.1 Putting Mediation in Context 
2.1.1 A Nature of Mediation 
Many policy tools are available for conflict prevention, management, and 
resolution. Fist then, what are the characteristics of international mediation? In an 
international arena with its perennial challenges of escalating conflicts, anarchical 
society and the absence of any generally accepted ‘rules of game’, mediation is 
almost as common as conflict itself. Mediation is only one form, albeit, most 
common one, of third party intervention. It is not a single process, or one discrete 
activity. It is instead a continuous set of related activities, involving actors, 
decisions and situations. Mediation encompasses a spectrum of behavior that 
ranges from very passive to highly active (Bercovitch, Anagnoson and Wille, 
1991:8).  
The approach we focus on is that of mediation. Mediation is by far the most 
common form of third-party intervention in international conflicts, however, a 
distinct form. It is initiated and performed on a voluntary basis, it is non-violent, 
and its proposals are non-binding. This stands in contrast to other types of third 
party intervention (Siniver, 2006:807). It is an approach predicated on the need to 
supplement the resolution process, but not to supplant the parties’ own conflict 
efforts, and mediation is particularly well suited to an environment where political 
actors guard their interests and autonomy jealously, and accept any outside 
interference in their affairs, only if it is strictly necessary and explicitly 
circumscribed. 
 
 
2.1.2 Definition 
There is little consensus in the literature on how mediation should be defined. 
Scholars from different disciplinary backgrounds offer different definitions and 
compound confusion and fragmentation (Bercovitch and Gartner, 2006:321-322). 
The reality of mediation is that of a complex, changing and dynamic interaction 
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between mediators, who have some resources and an interest in the conflict or in 
its outcome, and parties in conflict and their representatives (Bercovitch, 2002:7). 
Mediation operates within a system of exchange and social influence whose 
parameters are the actors, their communication, expectations, experience, 
resources, interests, and the situation within which they all find themselves 
(Bercovitch  and Gartner, 2006:322). A comprehensive definition seems to be a 
primary requisite for understanding this reality. Hence, this study adopted broad 
definition, which views mediation as a process of conflict management, related to 
but distinct from the parties’ own negotiations, where those in conflict seek the 
assistance, or accept an offer of help, from outsider to change their perceptions of 
behavior, and to do so without resorting to physical force or invoking the 
authority of the law (Bercovitch, 2002:7).  
 
2.1.3 Who May Mediate? 
A mediator may be a government that is not regarded as a part to the conflict, or it 
may be an agent from an international governmental organization. Some 
mediating services may be provided by nongovernmental individuals or groups 
who are not clearly seen as mediators; these include church officials, journalists, 
and academics constituencies that are not primary adversaries in the dispute 
(Kriesberg, 1996:226). In the last decade or so, we have seen an involvement of 
such parties as the United Nations, the pope, the African Union, the Organization 
of American States, the Arab League. Less formal mediation efforts by the 
Quakers or by prominent politicians such as President Carter, Lord Owen, occur 
on a daily basis (Bercovitch and Houston, 1996:12). Some mediating activities are 
provided by members of one of the adversary parties, who act as quasi-mediators. 
Although in this dual role, it is not always clear when such a person or 
organization is serving only the adversary party and when they are acting as a 
quasi-mediator (Kriesberg, 1996:226).  
 
2.1.4 The Rationale for Mediation 
Traditional approaches to mediation assume that both parties in dispute and a 
mediator have one compelling reason for initiating intervention; namely their 
desire to reduce, abate or resolve a conflict. This shared humanitarian interest may 
genuinely be the case in a few instances of mediation, but normally even this 
interest intertwines with other less altruistic interests (Bercovitch, 1992:9). The 
motives behind the involvement in the mediation process vary depending on the 
type of mediator. When the mediator is an unofficial individual, then it may be 
motivated by a desire to spread one’s ideas or to put them into practice. They may 
also wish to gain access to major political leaders and enhance their personal 
status. The official mediators and primarily political actors, whose this study has 
main interests in, engage in mediation and expand resources because they expect 
to resolve a conflict and gain something from it. For many actors, mediation is a 
policy instrument through which they can pursue some of their interests without 
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arousing too much opposition (Touval, 1992: 232-234). Adversaries on the other 
hand may actually wish the mediation to help them reduce the risk of an 
escalating conflict and express their commitment to an international norm of 
peaceful conflict management. However, they may expect the mediator to 
influence the other party, take blame for failed efforts or guarantee a reached 
agreement (Bercovitch, 1997 b: 134-135).      
 
2.1.5 Mediation Behavior and Strategy 
Considerable attention has been given to the question of mediator roles, functions 
and behavior. In essence, the practice of mediation resolves around the choice of 
strategic behaviors that mediators believe will facilitate the type of outcome they 
seek to achieve in the conflict management process. Mediator behavior is 
dependent on perceived roles or purpose and the resources and the techniques 
available within the specific dispute context. Mediation behavior can thus be 
understood as an overall plan or approach to conflict management to achieve a 
specific end: the settlement of a dispute (Bercovitch and Houston, 2000:174). A 
typology that is particularly useful in the context of international mediation is that 
offered by Touval and Zartman. They classify all mediation strategies as 
communication, formulation, or a manipulation approach. Communication 
strategies consist of searching, supplying, and clarifying information. Formulation 
strategies are designed to help the mediator gain and retain control over the 
process of interaction. The most active manipulation strategy involves the 
mediator directly changing the parties' decision-making process (Bercovitch and 
Wells, 1993: 5).    
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3 Analytical Framework 
3.1 Contingency Approach 
 
   
 
The contingency model has its roots in social- psychological theories of 
negotiation as developed by Sawyer and Guetzkow and modified by Druckman. 
The idea of contingency approach to third party intervention in intergroup and 
international conflict is gaining increasing currency (Fisher and Keashly, 
1991:32). Nevertheless, the contingency framework is particularly useful in the 
study of mediation. It offers a dynamic framework of interactive and reciprocal 
behavior. It provides a reproducible model of mediation that permits 
operationalization and analysis of individual contextual clusters, their interactions 
and relative importance within conflict management (Bercovitch and Houston, 
2000: 172). This approach regards the outcome of mediation efforts as contingent 
upon a number of contextual and process variables (Bercovitch, Anagnoson and 
Wille, 1991: 9). The basic rationale of the model is to intervene with the most 
appropriate methods at the relevant stages in order to de-escalate conflict through 
these stages. Success or failure in mediation is contingent upon particular the 
phase of conflict, and by the specific mediation strategy applied (Bercovitch, 
2002: 70). In the contingency approach, mediation is an adaptation for shifting 
circumstances in a fluid and dynamic world. And influence in mediation, such as 
the impact of mediator strategies and tactics, is contingent on a variety of factors- 
including contextual and process variables such as characteristics of the dispute 
and attributes of the mediator (Carnevale and Arad, 1996:39). 
For the purpose of this study, the contingency model applied by Bercovitch 
and Houston in their analysis of factors influencing mediation behavior in 
international conflicts (2000) was adopted and modified by combining it with 
model drawn on the theory of ‘cheap talk’ (see Figure 1.1). The ‘cheap talk’ 
model has been developed by Andrew Kydd in his article on a mediator’s role as 
a provider of information in the bargaining game (2003). To understand 
international mediation, we must see it as a triangular system of activities 
comprising an agent of social influence (i.e., mediator), targets of influence (i.e., 
disputing parties), and means of influence (i.e., mediators' resources). These 
activities interact with and influence each other. International mediation is a 
dynamic process that affects and purports to change a dispute or the way the 
parties perceive it. It is in turn affected by the very nature of the dispute 
(Bercovitch and Wells, 1993: 3-26).  
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Three major stages in the contingency model can be identified: antecedent, 
current and consequent stages. The antecedent stage is composed of three major 
contextual dimensions: preexisting, concurrent and background mediation 
contextual conditions (Bercovitch and Houston, 2000:174). Each of this affects 
mediation decision making and the choice of mediation strategy (Bercovitch and 
Houston, 2000:174). Mediation is shaped by those contextual conditions and 
characteristics of the situation. The specific rules, beliefs, attitudes, behaviors and 
symbols that make up international conflict impinge; perhaps even govern, on the 
process of mediation. As a social process, mediation may be as much of a variable 
as the disputants themselves (Bercovitch and Houston, 1996:17).  
The preexisting context dimension is composed of various contextual factors 
that reflect the diverse, complex, and dynamic nature of parties’ interactions and 
conflict behavior. These are the conditions of a conflict that come before any 
intervention and may influence, enhance, or constrain any third- party efforts.  
The second dimension refers to current conflict management and the 
mediation context. These include various attributes that the mediator may posses. 
In addition, this dimension also incorporates the specific contextual conditions 
that determine and may be determined by the actual intervention action (e.g. 
actual mediator behavior).  
The third dimension, background conditions of mediation context, refers to 
factors resulting from previous experiences with mediation that may directly 
affect the expectations of both the parties and the mediator of how the current 
mediation should be carried out or how effective it will be.  
The current stage has been supplemented with one contextual cluster, 
information provision. This dimension represents assumptions of ‘cheap talk’ 
model, which was used to modify the contingency model for the purpose of the 
study. Cheap talk is a communication in a strategic context that does not affect the 
payoffs directly but may affect them indirectly if it conveys information that can 
cause the players to modify their behavior. Therefore, by providing information 
about the resolve of the parties, the mediator can reduce the likelihood of the 
conflict. For a mediator to be effective, the parties must believe that the mediator 
is telling the truth, especially that the mediator counsels one side to make 
concessions because their opponent has high resolve and will employ force to 
safeguard its interests. In order to be trustworthy when they attempt to provide 
this information, the mediator must be biased. An unbiased mediator will not be 
seen as credible to the parties of dispute because the mediator may not be trusted 
to send messages that might increase the likelihood of conflict. Therefore, the 
model implies two assumptions: A mediator who attempts to persuade one side to 
make concessions because the other side has high resolve must be biased in favor 
of the side they are communicating with in order to be successful; Within the 
sample of successful mediation efforts, in the cases in which a mediator is biased 
toward one of the parties, that party will make larger concessions in the 
negotiation in comparison with what the other party does in cases in which the 
mediator is unbiased (Kydd, 2003: 599, 607).    
At the heart of this approach are clusters of context, process and outcome 
variables. Each cluster refers to specific characteristics of the party, the dispute, 
the mediator, and the outcome. It is the interaction of these three contextual 
dimensions, comprising actors and situational conditions that influence how 
mediator behavior is chosen and implemented and thus, the outcome of the 
mediation process. It is realistic, multidimensional, and a dynamic model that 
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permits empirical testing of actual conflict events (Bercovitch and Houston, 2000: 
172-174).  
Here, in this study, I wish to focus on how the first stage, and concurrent 
mediation context in particular, affects the final stage of the mediation- outcome. 
The basic contention here is that the outcome of the mediation process, successful 
or not, ultimately will depend on some of the contextual clusters. The contingency 
approach helps to conduct indepth analysis of interactions between contextual 
conditions and the outcome of mediation and identify propositions about the 
determinants of effective mediation.  
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 1.1: A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS 
Source: Bercovitch, J. The Structure and Diversity of Mediation in International Relations 
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understanding the mediation process. This is a comparative case study of 
mediation by Algeria and United States, which occurred to be effective although 
they demonstrated a contrary logic to traditional view, where both mediators were 
biased and had preferences over the issue in dispute. A case study permits a more 
intensive scrutiny of patterns and relationships, it can establish causal processes 
more clearly, and it can help individuals to emphasize the unique features of each 
case. Above all, the case study approach can contribute to one’s understanding of 
theoretical patterns and different outcomes. A detailed examination of a case can 
reveal interesting and often ignored dimensions, reveal the relationship between 
independent and dependent variables (Bercovitch, 1997 a: 218-219).  
Yin defines a case study as an empirical inquiry that ‘investigates a 
contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially between the 
boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident’. It is 
precisely the relationship between the phenomenon and the mediation context that 
is going to be investigated in this study. Research design using multiple case 
studies allows comparisons of findings, and most importantly in this context ‘the 
investigation of particular phenomenon in diverse setting’ (Oliver, 2004: 298). 
Because the aim of this study is to investigate the influence of a mediator’s bias 
on the outcome of mediation, the multiple case study approach focusing on 
comparable patterns of mediator behavior by different types of states was 
appropriate. 
The method of comparing few countries is divided primarily into two types of 
a system design: ‘most similar system design’ and ‘most different system design’. 
Most similar system designs (MSSD) seeks to compare political systems that 
share a host of common features in an effort to neutralize some differences while 
highlighting others. Most different system designs (MDSD), on the other hand, 
compares countries that do not share any common features apart from the political 
outcome to be explained and one or two explanatory factors seen to be important 
for that outcome. This is based on Mill’s system of agreement, which seeks to 
identify those features that are the same among different countries in an effort to 
account for a particular outcome. This study is going to use MDSD as a way of 
comparison. In this way, MDSD allows the study to distil out the common 
elements from the diverse set of countries that have a greater explanatory outcome 
(Landman, 2000: 32). The comparison is going to be conducted based on three 
criterions, involving each stage of the modified contingency approach: a 
mediator’s bias; a mediator’s strategy and behavior, which also includes the 
information provision; and outcome.   
3.2.1 Selection of Cases 
 
In order to carry out a multiple case study strategy, it was necessary to select 
cases which predict similar results (Yin, 1989: 53), and therefore, in which a 
mediator bias was represented and had similar functions in both mediation 
processes. Moreover, the two cases were selected with a goal in mind to depict 
similarities in mediation by small state and great power to draw a conclusion on 
the mediator’s bias in mediation by states as a natural feature of international 
community. The study adopted a state-centric perspective and it is not an aim of 
the study to refer to other types of mediators. Nevertheless, it can be argued that 
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the results of the study can be applied to another type of mediator- 
intergovernmental organizations. As entities created and constituted by states, 
international organizations cannot be entirely devoid of features and defects of its 
architect and component- state.          
3.2.2 A Note on Material 
 
The main empirical source of material on the mediation bias is secondary material 
related to the practice of mediation and desirable pattern of a mediator’s behavior, 
including books, edited volumes, academic articles as well as internet resources. 
The theoretical and empirical pieces applied in this study has been chosen as they 
offer analytical information and qualified explanations on a mediator’s bias as 
well as successful mediation efforts. However, secondary sources on cases of 
mediation analyzed here are not entirely objective and devoid of bias in favor of 
one side, and are used in this study thoughtfully and with appropriate 
consideration, in order to avoid this obstacle. Secondary resources are also being 
accounted for through news clipping, especially with respect to the analysis of the 
case study which required accuracy regarding facts and the sequence of affairs.  
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4 Mediator Bias and Success in 
Mediation 
4.1 The Elusive Notion of Success 
 
How does international mediation actually work? Under what conditions is it 
most effective? No doubt the issue of assessing outcomes of international conflict 
management is a tricky one. As international mediation is not uniform, it seems 
futile, to draw upon a set of criteria in order to cover many objectives of all 
mediators. Individual mediators, for instance, may emphasize communication- 
facilitative strategy, be more concerned with the quality of interaction, and seek to 
create a better environment for conflict resolution. States, on the other hand, may 
seek to change the behavior of those in conflict and achieve a formal settlement of 
sorts (Bercovitch, 2002:17). Analysts in the field seem to have dealt with the issue 
in three ways. First of all, in their attempt to reduce complexity, some have 
avoided defining a mediation success and failure altogether. It goes without 
saying that this becomes particularly problematic in comparative research. 
Second, some analysts have generated their own criteria for successful 
intermediary intervention. On the one hand, they have opted for highly simplified 
operationalizations to facilitate systematic analysis and measurement where 
success is a situation in which both parties to the conflict formally or informally 
accept a mediator and a mediative attempt within five days after the first attempt. 
The main disadvantage is that such criteria tend to be less suited to the 
complexities of international diplomacy. On the other hand, researchers have used 
broad definitions to retain flexibility: By successful outcomes we mean producing 
a cease fire, a partial settlement or a full settlement. Third group of analysts has 
equated mediation success with effectiveness, taking the mediator's (or the 
parties') objectives as their starting point. Although this goal-based approach has 
been well established in evaluation research, so have a number of penetrating 
criticisms. Whose goals are to be taken into account? Given that goals are often 
vague, implicit, and liable to change, which of the stated goals are taken as crucial 
(Kleiboer, 1996)?  
To answer the question whether or not mediation works, the study adopts 
broad criteria, subjective and objective, suggested by contingency approach. 
Subjective criteria refer to the parties’ or the mediators’ perception that the goals 
of mediation had been achieved, or that a desired change had taken place. Using 
the perspective, the mediation has been successful when the parties express 
satisfaction with the processor outcome of mediation, or when the outcome is 
seen as fair, efficient, or effective. They are subjective in that they are essentially 
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in the eyes of the parties in the conflict. Even, if a conflict remains unresolved, 
mediation -of any form- can do much to change the way the disputants feel about 
each other and lead, indirectly, to a long-term improvement in relationships. 
Objective for assessing the impact and the consequences of mediation offer a 
totally different perspective. Objective criteria relay on substantive indicators 
which may be demonstrated empirically. Usually such criteria involve 
observations of change and judgments about the extent of change as evidence of 
the success or failure in mediation (Bercovitch, 2002:17). Evaluating success or 
failure of international mediation in objective criteria is a relatively 
straightforward task. For the purpose of the study, the mediation outcome can be 
considered successful if it contributed to a cessation or reduction of violent 
behavior and hostilities, and the opening of the dialogue between the parties. It is 
also seen as successful when a formal and binding agreement that settles many of 
the issues in conflict has been signed. 
If one of the main concerns of this study is mediation success, then I should 
also refer to the central question of the study: Whether a mediator bias is more 
likely to foster success?  
Analysts who agree with the traditional thesis that mediator impartiality is a 
critical quality for successful mediation seems to assume a chain of effects 
following from impartiality: mediator impartiality is crucial for disputants' 
confidence in the mediator, which, in turn, is a necessary condition for the 
individual gaining acceptability, which, in turn, is essential for mediation success 
to come about. A variant of this impartiality-confidence-acceptability-success 
thesis has been used, for example, to explain the successful mediation results of 
the World Council of Churches in the Sudan Civil War and of the Vatican in the 
Beagle Channel dispute. 
Other analysts claim, however, that a mediator needs not be impartial in order 
to be successful. In their analysis of the Esquipulas peace process, a recent effort 
to resolve interstate conflict and promote regional integration in Central America, 
Wehr and Lederach emphasize the significance of the trust-based mediator in 
these societies but argue that this is not related to impartiality. On the contrary, 
the type of mediator that emerges is known as the 'insider-partial' as opposed to 
the 'outsider-neutral': 'A mediator from within the conflict, whose acceptability to 
conflictants is rooted not in distance from the conflict or objectivity regarding the 
issues, but rather in connectedness and trusted relationships with the conflict 
parties’. They do stress, however, that this type of mediator is more likely to 
originate in cultural settings where primary, face-to-face relations continue to 
characterize political, economic, and social exchange, and where tradition has 
been less eroded by modernity (Kleiboer, 1996: 369-371). 
Others go one step further by arguing that mediator acceptability is neither 
contingent upon impartiality nor on trust in the mediator, but instead on a 
mediator's bias toward one of the parties. Mediator bias can be an important basis 
of influence in mediation and can contribute to positive outcomes (Kleiboer, 
1996: 70). The Arad and Carnevale data suggest that a mediator’s proposals that 
were unfavorable were seen as more acceptable when the initial expectation was 
that the mediator would be on one's own side, which was labeled a 'cushioning' 
effect; and that mediators gained in acceptability when the initial expectation was 
that the mediator would be aligned with the other, but then made proposals that 
were clearly evenhanded, labeled as a 'fairness pays' effect (Carnevale and Arad, 
1994: 425). Many case studies of international mediation support the hypothesis 
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that biased mediation are more likely to foster success: the Soviet Union's 
mediation efforts in the war between India and Pakistan; Kissinger's mediation 
efforts in the Yom Kippur War in 1973; Carter's intervention between the same 
parties in 1976; Algerian mediation between Iran and the United States on the 
American hostages held in Iran in 1980; and the United States mediation attempts 
in the Israeli-Lebanese negotiations in 1983. In all these cases, the mediator was 
accepted and considered successful despite his perceived alliance with one of the 
parties (Kleiboer, 1996: 369-371). 
4.2 Understanding Bias in Mediation 
 
The issue of mediator impartiality has evoked intense debates among scholars 
of international mediation. Conceptually, some confusion exists because 
impartiality may refer to intention, consequence, or appearance. In addition, it is 
sometimes related to the mediator's attitudes toward the conflicting parties, at 
other times, to a mediator's stake in the substance of issues in conflict, at yet other 
times, to both. Analysts agree though, that impartiality is essentially a matter of 
perceptions of the parties in conflict (Kleiboer, 1996: 369). Analyses of 
international mediation have led to tentative identification of numerous 
characteristics of effective mediators and mediation. One requirement for 
successful mediation often stressed in such analyses is the mediator’s impartiality 
to the adversaries and their positions (Smith, 1985: 363). The idea that mediators 
need to be impartial in the conflicts they face is pervasive. Consider Young’s 
often quoted statement: ‘the existence of a meaningful role for a third party is 
being perceived as an impartial participant in the eyes of principal protagonists’. 
Given this, one might think that the very best mediator is a ‘Eunuch from Mars’, 
distant and disinterested, indifferent to the conflict and issues at hand (Carnevale 
and Arad, 1996: 40-41). The underlying logic of this requirement is that a 
mediator with a significant bias toward one party will be perceived as its ally. The 
opposing party will then regard the mediator with the same suspicion and hostility 
that already characterizes its attitude toward the ‘favored party’ (Smith, 1985: 
363). This together with the idea that impartial mediator is imbued with fairness, 
indicates that the impartial mediator has an influence advantage.  
4.2.1 ”Three-cornered Bargaining” 
 
 Another view regards mediation as an extension of negotiation, as ‘three-
cornered bargaining’ where the mediator is a player in a realist framework of 
international politics. Mediation is seen as a policy instrument and a preferred 
alternative in a choice situation. In this framework it is better to accept a 
particular mediator than to reject that mediator, particularly given a ‘hurting 
stalemate’ and the fact that continuation of a conflict is costly. In other words, real 
bias can play an important role in mediation when the bias adds to the mediator’s 
capacity and desire to influence (Carnevale and Arad, 1996: 41-42). When one 
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considers the role of individual nations as a mediator in international conflict, 
however, it is difficult to see how the criterion of impartiality can be met. In most 
cases, the mediation nation’s interests in resolving the conflict stems from 
considerable interest in its own relationship with one or both of the adversaries. 
The mediator offers its services either out of fear that his/her own interest may be 
injured in the course of the conflict, or in the hope that it may gain something 
from the adversaries of their allies. Furthermore, the mediator may have a direct 
stake in the particulars of any agreement that the adversaries may reach 
independent of the adversaries’ position. Far from being the detached and 
disinterested broker that is evidenced in the traditional vision of mediator, the 
international mediator is often a highly involved and interested party (Smith, 
1985: 365).  
4.2.2 Biased Mediator 
 
A ‘biased mediator’ is one who has closer ties with one of the parties to the 
conflict, and is perceived as such by both sides (Touval, 1985: 375). However, 
having closer ties with one party does not ordinarily cancel the mediator’s interest 
in the other. For one thing, the natures of interests to be served may well differ 
with respect to each party. The mediator’s ties with one side may stem from an 
ideological affinity and economic cooperation, while those with the other may 
involve military alliances against parties outside the focal conflict. Not only the 
interest with each adversary can be different, but the bias itself can vary. 
Carnevale and Arad identify two basic forms of bias in mediation: [1] bias of 
content, which pertains to mediator behavior, for example one side being favored 
over the other in the mediator’s settlement proposal and, [2] bias of source 
characteristics, which pertains to expectations that stem from the mediator’s 
closer personal, political, or economic ties with one party (Carnevale and Arad, 
1996: 45). Mediators are motivated to serve all such interests, and enter the 
conflict out of a desire to avoid having to choose between the parties. In analyzing 
the role of a mediating nation in international conflict, it is important to identify 
the mediator’s interest in each of the adversaries, as well as it own direct interests 
in the particular of any agreement (Smith, 1985: 366).  
Mediators often empower weaker parties in the interest of an equitable 
settlement to end human misery. However, in international politics, peacemaking 
is often intertwined with less altruistic self-interests of mediators. In particular, 
governmental intermediaries often have an axe to grind. Touval and Zartman 
distinguish between 'defensive' and 'expansionist' motives. Defensive motives 
may emerge when a conflict between two states threatens a mediator's interest. 
For example, a conflict between two neighboring states may upset a regional 
power balance or may provide opportunities for a rival power to increase its 
influence by intervening in the dispute. This is one of the reasons why the 
Organization of American States (OAS) nearly exclusively plays an intermediary 
role in Latin America: to reduce opportunities for external intervention and 
interference within the region. Partial mediators may also engage in mediation for 
expansionist motives: the desire to extend and increase their resources, influence, 
and power. This was the case when Egypt secretly intervened in the war between 
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Iraq and Iran in 1974; it also prompted Kissinger's efforts in the Middle East 
conflict (Kleiboer, 1996: 371) 
4.2.3 Why the Adversaries accept the services of a biased mediator? 
 
The answer appears to lie in the interdependence between the adversaries and the 
mediator. From the perspective of each adversary, the mediator’s interest in a 
relationship with one of it gives it some leverage over the mediator. Even if a 
party to the conflict believes that the mediator has strong ties to its opponent, it 
will accept the mediation to the extent that it feels it has something to offer or 
withhold in its relationship with the mediator (Smith, 1985: 366). In short, a 
biased mediator may be an attractive option as long as the mediator has 
particularly strong ties to the party with greater control over the outcome of the 
conflict. Whatever partiality results from these ties is balanced by the mediator's 
greater capacity to influence that party. The party that does not have any relations 
with the mediator hopes or expects that the mediator will use his partiality to 
influence the adversary (Kleiboer, 1996: 370). The mediator also has something 
to offer the adversaries. In part what it can offer each side derives from its 
relationship with the other. One party can expect the mediator’s relationship with 
the other to offer leverage in the conflict- leverage not available to the one party 
alone. Indeed, in many cases, the stronger the mediator’s relationship with the 
other party, the greater its leverage; hence, the more desirable it is as a mediator 
(Smith, 1985: 366). In addition, the party that is favored may want to preserve its 
relationship with the mediator and the disfavored party may seek to earn the 
mediator’s goodwill. This effect is heightened to the extent that the mediator has 
benefits to provide, such as the resources to reward concessions and cooperation 
(Carnevale and Arad, 1996: 42). The biased mediator can be expected to use its 
relationship with each of the parties to gain concessions for the other. Further, it 
can be expected to heed each party’s vital interests in pressing for concessions, 
and in helping to develop new alternatives because of its interests in the 
relationship with that party. With the respect to credibility, biased mediators can 
be trusted not to advocate actions that would endanger their own interests in each 
of the parties. They are trusted not because they are disinterested, but because 
their joint interest in both parties keeps them from being the pawn of either 
(Smith, 1985: 367).  
4.2.4 Patterns of Bias 
 
For convenience and without rigidity, biases can be classified into three groups: 
personal, situational, and structural. Of these, personal bias is by far the most 
widely recognized form. Most people would describe a palpable preference for 
the negotiator or principals of one party as a personal bias. Also, in disputes 
where a serious philosophical gulf exists, a mediator may have a propensity to 
think along the general lines of one of the parties. In addition, past associations or 
a partisan employment history of the mediator can give the appearance of bias.  
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Situational bias refers to those biases which result from a mediator's source of 
appointment and obligations to persons or parties other than those immediately 
involved in the dispute. In most types of disputes, the intercession of some 
organizational third party, with interest of its own, is necessary to enable the 
parties to accept a given mediator. This interest can affect both the mediator's 
actions and the parties' perceptions, because a mediator with enough of a 
relationship to an appointing agency to be selected may be presumed to have 
some degree of fealty to that agency.  
Structural biases, which stem directly from the nature of mediation, are the 
most obscure and the least avoidable. There are several types of structural biases. 
Among these biases are tendencies for the process to benefit weaker parties over 
stronger ones, moderate factions over radical, and negotiators over principals. 
Another bias, which has no reliable preference for any particular participant, is the 
tendency for the process to favor a quick or easy way out instead of a real and 
enduring solution. Finally, the most pernicious problem is that mediation can be 
an effective tool for a party determined to negotiate in bad faith (Honeyman, 
1985: 141-150). 
4.2.5 Mediation Within International Community 
 
In an international community, members are locked into a continuous, ongoing 
relationship, with virtually no ability to escape the system or terminate their 
interaction. They are interdependent; what happens to one affects the fortunes of 
others (Touval, 1985: 374). Furthermore, since the international community is 
small by the standards of modern human communities, each member state knows 
each of the others and has some interests in each of them. The result is that each 
member is likely to form a web of interests in any particular conflict (Smith, 
1985: 365). Since conflict between some members of the system may affect the 
welfare and relative power of others, third parties tend to intervene. Mediation, 
like other forms of intervention, is motivated by self-interest. Because of the 
nature of the community- the interdependence that prevails, and the likelihood 
that any agreement reached between the disputants would affect the mediator’s 
own power and influence- mediators normally have a stake in the manner in 
which conflict is resolved, and in the particulars of any agreement reached. Thus, 
the purpose of the mediator’s intervention is not merely conflict resolution, but 
also the protection and promotion of mediators own interests. Such mediators will 
often intervene uninvited, at their own initiative. Because of self interest in the 
particulars of any agreement reached, the mediator’s involvement might extend to 
guaranteeing the agreement and actively participating in its implementation 
(Touval, 1985: 375). Finally, in such a community, where interest and influence 
are overlapping, it is natural that mediators are biased. It would be unwise and 
misleading to conceal vital interests and pretend to be impartial. Mediator’s bias 
is a logical consequence of the way the international community is organized. 
Even the mediation efforts by international organizations, traditionally considered 
as neutral are rarely detached from the conflict, with member states pressuring the 
mediator and threatening to withdraw support from any mediated solution that 
does not please them (Smith, 1985: 365). Moreover, this refers to each member of 
international community, not only big states with leverage. Therefore, it is naive 
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to expect the nation’s mediator to behave in an impartial manner though the 
nature of an international community and the state itself. The traditional emphasis 
on impartiality stems from the failure to recognize mediation as a structural 
extension of bilateral bargaining and negotiation. It is extremely sensible to see 
mediation as an ‘assisted negotiation’. To regard mediation as an exogenous input 
is both erroneous and unrealistic (Bercovitch, Anagnoson and Wille, 1991: 15). 
The mediator when engaging in a mediation process cannot pretend to function 
outside the international community and the interests which underpin its behavior.  
Biased mediation, therefore, is nothing new and should not be surprising for 
the adversaries. Among the historical cases that correspond to the definition of 
biased mediation are the Anglo-American mediation between Italy and 
Yugoslavia in the Trieste dispute (1953-1954), the Soviet mediation between 
India and Pakistan at Tashkent (1965-1966), American mediation between Syria 
and Israel (1974), American mediation in the Falkland Islands Crisis of 1982 and 
the two cases analyzed in this study: Algerian mediation in Iranian Hostage Crisis 
and United States mediation between Israel and Egypt performed by Henry 
Kissinger. In all of these cases the mediator was perceived as biased. Britain and 
the United States were bound to Italy by a formal alliance and by close political 
bonds, while their relationship with communist Yugoslavia was much more 
tenuous. The Soviet Union had, for many years, been India’s most important 
supporter in its conflict with Pakistan, providing India with military and economic 
aid, as well as diplomatic backing. Yet in all these cases, the biased mediator was 
accepted by the disfavored party, and both sides cooperated with the mediator in 
bringing about agreement that reduced the conflict, and protected the mediator’s 
interests (Touval, 1985: 375-376). 
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5 Using Bias to Make Peace? 
5.1 Small-State Mediation 
 
Small states can prove invaluable as mediators in international conflicts. Precisely 
because they are small states, and therefore lacking in reward and coercive power, 
they are likely to be viewed as non-threatening actors who may be ideally 
positioned to convey messages back and forth between adversaries. In addition, a 
small state may be able to exercise a from of legitimate power, stemming for its 
relative powerlessness to impose agreement. Moreover, small states may be 
particularly well suited in disputes between states of unequal power. The small 
state, as a mediator, may be regarded as sympathetic and trustworthy by the 
weaker state, while being considered non-threatening by the more powerful 
(Rubin, 1992: 266-267). 
 
5.1.1 Background 
On November 4th, 1979, revolutionary students stormed the United States 
embassy in Tehran taking dozens of American staff hostage. Freeing the hostages 
became a priority for the administration of United States President Jimmy Carter, 
but there was little to be done beyond ineffective economic sanctions. President 
Carter pledged to preserve the lives of the hostages and conducted intense 
diplomacy to secure their release. But his failure ultimately contributed to his 
losing the presidency to Ronald Reagan in 1980. Neither side was in a mood for 
greater compromise. After months of negotiations, helped by Algerian 
intermediaries and the Shah's death, United States diplomacy bore fruit. On the 
day of President Ronald Reagan's inauguration, 20 January 1981, the hostages 
were set free (news.bbc.co.uk). What is thought to have started as a sit-in planned 
to last at most three to five days evolved into a siege that lasted 444 days, 
contributed to the political demise of an American president, and threatened a 
military confrontation between Iran and the United States (Slim, 1992: 206). 
 
5.1.2 Preexisting Context 
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From the beginning, the dispute was only one element in a larger historical 
framework that encompassed twenty-five years of relations between the United 
States and the Shah’s regime. During that time many of the religious clerics were 
exiled. Many Iranians were jailed and tortured by the dreaded Savak. The hostage 
issue was also cast in the context of the opposition to the Western world. On 
October 28th, 1979, seven days prior to the embassy take over; Khomeini declared 
in a speech that ‘all the problems of the East stem from these foreigners, from the 
West, from the America at the moment. All our problems come from America. 
All the problems of the Moslem stem from the America’. Moreover, Khomeini 
and the Iranian leaders adopted a frame of reference that is rooted in the Shi’a 
political world view. From this perspective, all leaders, since the disappearance of 
the last Shi’a Imam, have been viewed as usurpers of power. Since he considered 
the United States as a real power behind the throne during the Shah’s era, 
Khomeini couched his opposition to the United States in the language of just 
opposition towards oppressors. The hostages then became a symbol of the 
struggle to redress past grievances and injustice (Slim, 1992: 211-213).  
A mix of factors combined to make the possibility of a settlement unlikely 
during the first few months of the crisis. These factors included the passionate 
hatred Khomeini and the other clerics entertained toward the United States, 
making direct dialogue between the two parties quite impossible; the vastly 
different cultural and religious values separating the two parties. Moreover, a 
dynamic and constantly changing political situation inside Iran, made the task of 
finding a legitimate and permanent Iranian spokesperson impossible; and the 
difficulties posed by such non-negotiable demands as the militant students’ 
insistence on the extradition of the Shah (Slim, 1992: 214-215 
5.1.3 Background Mediation Contextual Conditions 
From the beginning of the crisis, there was no dearth of potential mediators. Both 
on their own initiative and at the request of the American government, a variety of 
individuals and organizations tried to mediate between the governments of Iran 
and the United States (Slim, 1992: 206).  
In a Time Magazine interview given in January of 1981, Khomeini indirectly 
condemned all attempts of mediation between the United States and Iran by 
saying, ‘I want to drive home to all peoples throughout the world the point that 
they should not try to mediate between the oppressor and the oppressed. Such a 
mediation itself is a great injustice….The right approach, under these 
circumstances, is to rush to the side of the oppressed and implacably attack the 
oppressor. It is for this reasons that we rejected the offers of mediation and will 
continue to do so’ (Slim, 1992: 212).  
When Iranian Prime Minister Mohammed Ali Radjai visited the United 
Nations in October 1980, the Algerian ambassadors reiterated their earlier offer of 
help (Slim, 1992: 217). It was not until November 2nd 1980, that the Iranian 
government publicly endorsed Algeria as the legitimate channel of 
communication between Iran and the United States. At that time, the Iranian 
prime minister’s spokesperson declared that there would be no direct talks 
between the United States and Iran, and that all contacts between the two 
governments would be conducted via the offices of the Algerian embassy in 
Washington.     
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Algeria was one of the very few countries with positive and friendly relations 
with the revolutionary regime in Teheran. Iranians had a great deal of respect for 
the Algerian revolution, which they considered to be the precursor of their own 
revolution. The Algerian revolution still stands in the Arab world as a powerful 
symbol for the end of the colonization era. Algerian authorities were steadfast in 
their support of the Iranian revolution. And while they never publicly endorsed 
the embassy takeover, they also never publicly voiced their misgivings about the 
event. The Iranians were grateful. Despite Iran’s war with Iraq and the drain on its 
resources, the Iranian leadership managed to send humanitarian assistance to 
Algerian victims of the disastrous Al-Asnam earthquake. The relations between 
the United States and Algeria, on the other hand, could never have been described 
as warm, but they were not unfriendly. The United States was Algeria’s most 
productive trading partner. During the visit to Algiers in 1979 to attend a 
ceremony commemorating the anniversary of Algerian revolution, the United 
States national security advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski had commented positively 
on Algeria’s policy on non-alignment, and stressed the Carter’s administration’s 
opposition to any aggression against Algeria (Slim, 1992: 207-209).  
Algeria had already accumulated considerable credit internationally, as a 
result of past mediation activities in both Africa and Middle East. Moreover, Iran 
as well as the United States had once before relied on Algeria’s mediation offices. 
In 1970, the administration of President Nixon requested Algeria’s assistance in 
negotiations between the United States and the South Vietnamese National 
Liberation Front. Algeria was also engaged in mediating between Iran and Iraq, 
the agreement which allowed the two countries to settle the long standing 
territorial dispute (Slim, 1992: 218). In those days there were not many countries 
with which both Iran and the United States had working relationships and over 
which they could agree as an acceptable and trustworthy intermediary. As Gary 
Sick, a National Security Council staff member, notes that ‘Algeria had left the 
impression on several occasions that it was prepared to be helpful on a quiet basis 
if that assistance did not threaten its relations with Iran’. Moreover, it was hoped 
that Algerians could be transformed into advocates for the American position 
(1985: 26). Algeria was the one party to enjoy credibility with both protagonists. 
 
5.1.4 Algeria’s Bias as Contextual Dimension of Antecedent Stage 
Critical to Algeria’s intervention was the perception by both protagonists that it 
had no direct interest at stake. However, Algeria’s mediation involvement was not 
entirely motivated by humanitarian reasons.  
Since the overthrow of Shah, the Algerians have been trying to strengthen the 
relationship with the new Iranian leadership. Algeria has always been considered 
as a radical outcast by the majority of the Arab states. Therefore, the emergence 
of another revolutionary state with which they shared many political attitudes was 
a boon to Algeria. Moreover, a close relationship with Iran was also helpful in 
enhancing Algeria’s position in OPEC, in which Iran occupies a major position, 
as Algeria is heavily dependent on income generated from the sale of resources 
such as oil and natural gas. 
Algerians were also interested in improving their relations with the United 
States. By succeeding in releasing the hostages, Algeria would accumulate 
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goodwill on the part of Americans, which they hoped to use in obtaining more 
favorable terms for the sale of their natural gas in the United States. They were 
also hoping to stop the flow of advanced American technology into Morocco 
(Slim, 1992: 224-225). 
Additionally, the primary motive of the Algeria has been its energetic efforts 
to prevent or help solve regional conflicts, especially in Africa and the Arab 
world, activities fueled by their desire to prevent further superpower involvement 
in both regions (Slim, 1992: 220).  
 
5.1.5 Algeria’s Behavior and Strategy 
Algeria customarily insisted, at least publicly, on a very limited role. Their policy 
was to avoid operating in the public eye as much as possible. In fact, they have 
frequently engaged in sub rosa mediation, while asking involved parties to keep 
their role as quiet as possible. Throughout negotiations, Algeria functioned as a 
devil’s advocate, taking each side’s position in turn, critizing it, asking questions, 
raising issues that might concern or arose defensiveness in the other side (Slim, 
1992: 221). Tactically, the Algerians provided a ‘cool screen’ between two angry 
adversaries. Iran was burning with revolutionary and religious passion in the wake 
of the seemingly miraculous overthrow of the monarchy, while the United States 
seethed with righteous wrath at Iran’s flouting of international law and elementary 
human rights. Direct conversation was impossible under these circumstances, and 
a translator or interpreter was required to permit each party to listen to what the 
other had to say (Sick, 1985: 52-53).  
As a party that had itself negotiated from a position of weakness, the 
Algerians also understood the importance of face saving. It was essential for the 
Iranians to not appear as if they have given in to the ‘Great Satan’, a perception 
that would have irreversibly damaged the Iranian leadership’s credibility in the 
eyes of their people. For the American administration, it was crucial not to appear 
to have paid ransom for the hostages- to have given in to the illegal behavior of 
the Iranians. This would have sent a disastrous message to others in the Third 
World. As an intermediary, Algeria was in a sense, a face saver for both 
protagonists (Slim, 1992: 223).  
 
5.1.6 Information Provision 
Algeria’s primary role was to carry messages and proposals back and forth 
between the two protagonists, since Khomeini had issued an order at the outset of 
the crisis that there would be no face-to-face meeting with the American 
representatives (Slim, 1992: 222). As neither party was eager to drop out of the 
process, the mediator presumably felt it necessary on occasion to exert pressure 
on one of both parties to make concessions by providing information about the 
resolve of the other party and drawing the parties’ attention to the dangers of 
failure. Most of the pressure was directed at the Iranians and the most important 
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pressure factor was the existence of an irrevocable deadline- the inauguration of a 
new president in Washington (Sick, 1985: 51-52).   
 
5.1.7 Outcome 
The purpose of the Algerian mediation was to find a formula which would allow 
the release of the hostages on one hand, and the release of the Iranian assets, on 
the other. By the objective criteria, Algerians achieved a successful outcome. The 
settlement regulating issues of Iranian assets and the release of hostages was 
accepted by both parties. The agreement was implemented and its clauses 
respected by both parties (Slim, 1992: 227). Moreover, Algerians also achieved 
their objectives. They succeed in maintaining positive relations with both parties. 
Algerians became also the recipients of a remarkable popular outpouring of 
emotion and accumulated a reservoir of goodwill and affection with the American 
people. 
In the subjective criteria, the Algerian mediation seems to be also perceived as 
a successful task. Gary Sick, a National Security Council staff member for Iran 
under the Carter administration, interprets the outcome by writing: ‘It is enough to 
note that, without mediation, the crisis between Iran and the United States over 
the hostages could well have had a much different and possibly tragic outcome. 
For that reason above all, the Algerians who accepted this task and carried it 
through with such skill deserve the gratitude and respect of the United States, Iran 
and the international community’ (Sick, 1985: 51, 53).  
5.2 Great Power Mediation 
 
The most obvious sources of power available to large states are reward and 
coercion. Their political influence, and their vast material capabilities, enables 
them to apply sticks and carrots, and provide them with important resources for 
engaging in mediation. If an international organization or a small state relies on its 
personal credibility to intervene effectively, then large states and superpowers can 
fall back on ‘mediation with muscle’. Large states may also be tempted to impose 
the agreements that are to their liking (Rubin, 1992: 267-268). 
 
5.2.1 Background 
Since the emergence of the Israeli state, its legitimate existence was constantly 
denied by neighboring Arab countries. This made the Arab-Israeli conflict 
unpreventable and it included many wars and military confrontations since 1948. 
The War between Israel and Arab countries in the regions took place in 1948-49, 
1967 Six Day War, 1969-70 War of Attrition, 1973 Yom Kippur War. Moreover, 
Israel participated in 1956 the war against Egypt. The peace discussion at the end 
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of the Yom Kippur War was the first time that Arab and Israeli officials met for 
direct public discussions since the aftermath of the 1948 war. The American 
Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, acted as a peace broker between Egypt and 
Israel. In September 1975, Egypt and Israel signed an interim agreement which 
declared their willingness to settle their differences by peaceful means rather than 
by military. This was to lead to the American sponsored talks at Camp David. 
 
5.2.2 Preexisting Context 
In the aftermath of the Yom Kippur, the movement towards greater pragmatism 
by the disputants in managing their conflict with outside assistance was reflected 
in the Six Point Agreement signed by Israel and Egypt at Kilometre 101 on the 
11th of November in 1973. The agreement called upon two parties to observe 
scrupulously the United Nations ceasefire and to commence negotiations 
immediately to settle the question of return to the 22nd October positions within 
the framework with agreement on disengagement and separation of forces. By the 
time, Egypt, Israel and the United States were ready to enter negotiations in the 
January 1974, a number of conditions conducive to effective mediation were 
already in place. To begin with, parties agreed to forego their immediate demands 
in favor of negotiating the broader withdrawal of forces as part of larger 
disengagement process. Second, the parties were accepting and encouraging 
United States mediation. Third, both parties now agreed bilateral conflict 
reduction initiatives could be implemented independent of other developments in 
the Arab-Israeli conflict. Finally, Egypt and Israel acknowledged the possibility of 
engaging in the mediated negotiations pertaining to functional and technically 
matters despite the absence of working political-diplomatic relations (Mandell 
and Tomlin, 1991: 48).  
 
5.2.3 Background Mediation Contextual Conditions 
Following the Yom Kippur War, for the first time an initial learning process 
began, in which Israel and Egypt decided to accept the modification of their 
conflict. Both sides accepted transforming means for accomplishing incompatible 
objectives, although the fundamental grievances and differences between the 
parties remained unaltered. Both parties realized that war was no longer an 
effective means for achieving political and military objectives. Both sides were 
ripe for selecting alternative techniques of conflict management to prevent war. 
This needed some tacit or even explicit cooperation. However, the mere incentive 
to cooperate was not sufficient to bring such bitter and suspicious belligerents to 
see the value of a joint discussion of their security interests. A credible and 
energetic third party was required to transform the apparent will to collaborate 
into concrete initiatives.  
Egypt and Israel preferred the United States to help them in restructuring their 
security relations (Bar-Siman-Tov, 1994: 84-85). President Sadat and Secretary of 
State Kissinger, working together very quickly after the October War, shut the 
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Soviet Union out of the bargaining process and created a new three-sided 
negotiating structure, the triad. Even before the war, Sadat had recognized that the 
United States, as a superpower patron of Israel, was uniquely suited to mediating 
the conflict by extracting concessions from its ally (Stein, 1985: 332). Aware of 
the importance of solely managing and stabilizing the Arab-Israeli conflict, the 
United States intervened immediately to assist Egypt and Israel to stabilize the 
ceasefire and to reduce the conflict. In a very short time period, two formal 
agreements were concluded: the Six Point Agreement and the Disengagement 
Agreement, which both stabilized the ceasefire and institutionalized the 
management of the conflict (Bar-Siman-Tov, 1994: 84-85).  
 
5.2.4 United States’ Bias as Contextual Dimension of Antecedent 
Stage 
The Yom Kippur War of October 1973 proved to be a watershed not only in terms 
of the role of the United States in the conflict, but also in the profile and functions 
of the American mediator. United States foreign policy in the wake of the war 
aimed to secure three objectives: mending relations with the Arab world; lifting 
the oil embargo of the Arab oil producing countries; and pushing the Soviets out 
of the Middle East. The fact that the mediator had a direct interest in the conflict 
and the outcome of any settlement precluded it from being impartial. Kissinger 
could not deny the American priorities in the Middle East, nor could he hide his 
Jewish origins (Siniver, 2006: 816). The United States certainly had interest in the 
security of Israel. The United States commitment to Israel was clear not only from 
the context of the historical relationship of these countries, but also more 
immediately from the emergency military support the United States provided 
Israel after the Yom Kippur attack by Egypt and Syria. However despite the 
apparent bias toward Israel, Egypt willingly co-operated with Kissinger. Almost 
paradoxically, it was the special relationship with Israel that enabled Kissinger to 
push them toward concessions. In addition, the United States had also vital 
interest in blunting Soviet influence in Egypt, as well as in convincing Arab 
nations to end the oil embargo (Smith, 1985: 366, 369)). The lure of economic 
and military aid, as well as the promise of security guarantees, was attractive to 
Israel; at the same time, Egyptian President Sadat, who became disillusioned with 
Moscow, was eager to improve relations with Washington and, like Israel, to 
enjoy its economic and political patronage. Egypt sought also leverage with 
Israel. In this case then, the mediator’s ability to exert power was clearly more 
important than his perceived impartiality, in the disputants’ calculations whether 
to accept its invitation (Siniver, 2006: 817).  
In offering mediation, the Nixon administration promised an evenhanded 
approach, but United States military support continued to flow to Israel. In effect, 
the statement of impartiality could not be viewed, at least initially, as a 
repudiation of the alliance with Israel, since concrete evidence of continuing 
United States support for Israel was obvious (Smith, 1985: 369). Despite United 
States’ obvious bias, Kissinger succeeded in wining both parties’ confidence and 
respect. Israelis were convinced that Kissinger had played straight with them and 
fairly represented their views to the other side. Arab envoys, on the other hand, 
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admitted to the New York Times that ‘Mr. Kissinger’s role is a good faith 
mediator (Perlmutter, 1975: 326). 
 
5.2.5 Step-by-Step Diplomacy: Kissinger’s Behavior and Strategy 
Tactically, the mediation efforts of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, which 
produced two disengagement agreements between Israel and Egypt in eighteen 
months, were perhaps the first instance in the conflict of a mediator having learnt 
the lessons of past diplomatic failures. While previous intermediaries produced 
overly ambitious and comprehensive plans for peace which instilled a certain 
rigidity in the parties (the experiences of Bernadotte; UN Ambassador Jarring 
following the Six Day War; and Secretary of State Rogers in 1969, are notable 
examples), Kissinger opted for a more limited, realistic approach to conflict 
resolution. Known as step-by-step diplomacy, Kissinger aimed to conclude a 
series of ‘small’ agreements that would help promote confidence and trust 
between the disputants, which could then be built upon at a later stage during 
negotiations on the final status of the more contentious issues (Siniver, 2006: 816-
817). Kissinger maintained absolute control of the agenda throughout the 
negotiating process. He carefully ordered the agenda, beginning with the easier 
issues and proceeding to the more difficult. Moreover, when Kissinger saw no 
opportunity to move the parties on an issue of fundamental importance to one or 
the other, he removed it entirely for the bargaining agenda. He did so because he 
insisted that failure was more dangerous, that it could destroy the carefully built-
up fabric of interconnected small agreements and damage confidence not only 
among the parties to the negotiation but, as important, in the mediator (Stein, 
1985: 338, 342). Although limited, the two disengagement agreements between 
Israel and Egypt in January 1974 and September 1975, and saw for the first time 
the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Arab territory. By all accounts power was 
the quintessential element in Kissinger’s mediation style. Effectively in control of 
American foreign policy, Kissinger was able to reward acquiescence in the form 
of military and economic aid. Furthermore, the American desire to bring an end to 
the energy crisis and to improve relations with the Arab world, meant that on 
occasion- particularly during negotiations on the second Israeli-Egyptian 
disengagement, it seemed that Kissinger was much more eager to conclude an 
agreement than the disputants themselves (Siniver, 2006: 816-817). 
Perhaps, the most significant feature of Kissinger’s tactic was the moment of 
breakthrough. At this stage of mediation process, when the parties has been 
persuaded of the ‘advantages of compromise’ and are convinced that their interest 
are converge with those of mediator, Kissinger pulled out a plan which embodied 
his views of what the adversaries can and should surrender. The plan defined the 
nature and structure of the compromise. The adversaries were not permitted to 
decide on the time and place of the breakthrough, as it was Kissinger’s most 
guarded domain. Kissinger’s negotiating style is to wait until the last moment, so 
that any American proposal does not become a subject of the negotiations. In the 
words of a key Egyptian official, ‘Kissinger produced a proposal and we 
accepted’ (Perlmutter, 1975: 335, 337). 
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5.2.6 Information Provision  
The mediation between Israel and Egypt was structured in a triad. Bargaining 
took place exclusively between Egypt and the United States, and Israel and the 
United States; never between Egypt and Israel (Stein, 1985: 333). This 
configuration allowed the mediator to counsel each side to make concessions by 
appearing extremely understanding and sympathetic to adversaries’ positions. 
Most of such pressure was directed at Israel. Thus, Kissinger approached Israel in 
the spirit of understanding, warning the Israelis of the supposed Soviet threat and 
the withdrawal of American support if Israel was to reject the propositions of 
settlement between Israel and Egypt. During the shuttle negotiations on Egyptian-
Israeli troop separation, Kissinger told Golda Meir, ‘You must cooperate with me 
on releasing the Egyptian Third Army and opening the Canal. The Russians are 
threatening; you’d better hurry Mr. Meir’. Once the Israelis were convinced of the 
threat, negotiations were on the verge of a steep breakthrough (Perlmutter, 1975: 
334, 336).     
 
5.2.7 Outcome 
Kissinger orchestrated two disengagement agreements between Israel and Egypt 
within eighteen months. Its terms are well known: Israel agreed to withdraw its 
forces to the foothills of two strategic passes, the Mitla and the Gidi, in the Sinai 
peninsula and to return the Abu Rodeis oil field to Egypt in an exchange for and 
Egyptian agreement to refrain from a use of force for three years and to permit the 
transit of non-strategic cargo to and from Israel through the Suez Canal. The 
agreement marked the first time that Israel had agreed to a significant withdrawal 
of its forces since June 1967 and the first time an Arab leader openly supported 
the functional equivalent of non-belligerency (Stein, 1985: 331-332). When 
evaluating Kissinger’s mediation in objective criteria, the United States achieved 
success. The agreement was signed and the security relations between Israel and 
Egypt restructured. In addition, United States’ goals to mend relations with the 
Arab world and push the Soviet Union out of the Middle East were also achieved.  
For Kissinger himself, the mediation efforts and the two disengagement 
agreements were suppose to initiate a peace process. In that manner, Kissinger 
expressed his opinion during the conversation with a group of American Jewish 
leaders. As such, the mediation outcome was perceived by Kissinger and 
therefore evaluated in subjective criteria as being successful. Kissinger saw also a 
peace process as a main objective of his strategy: step-by-step diplomacy, which 
were fulfilled by accepting the disengagement agreements and he summarized it 
in a very straightforward way: ‘We told the Israelis they could got to the 
Europeans if they wanted proclamation, but if they wanted progress towards 
peace they would have to come to us. Thus, the step-by-step process begun’ 
(Kissinger, 1981: 188). 
5.3 Small-State Versus Great Power 
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5.3.1 Mediator’s Bias 
The Algerian as well as the American mediation efforts proved the logic that 
having an interest in one party does not cancel mediator’s interest in the other and 
the nature of such interests may well differ with respect to each party. The United 
States certainly had an interest in the security of Israel; it had also vital interests in 
blunting the Soviet influence in Egypt and convincing Arab nations to end oil 
embargo. The same logic is true for Algeria, a small non-alignment country, 
which although being obviously biased towards Iran, had also incentives to 
improve its relations with the United States. Moreover, the mediators did not even 
pretend to be deprived of interest and behave in an impartial manner. For Algeria 
and the United States, the engagement in mediation was reasoned by their 
motives, both defensive and expansionist. 
So the question remains as to why the countries in dispute chose a bias 
mediator? Iran and Israel had obvious confidence in a mediator to safeguard their 
interests. Moreover, they were grateful for past support and wanted to preserve 
good relations with the mediating country. The United States and Egypt, on the 
other hand, believed that the biased mediator would easily persuade the other side 
to make concessions, having in mind that joint interest in both parties keeps the 
mediator from being the pawn of the adversary.  
 
5.3.2 Mediator’s Behavior and Strategy 
The strategy adopted by the American and Algerian mediators was undoubtedly 
chosen on the basis of the nature of relations between the mediator and 
adversaries and the mediator’s own motives. However, the size of mediating state 
influences the scope of strategies available to mediator. Therefore the actions 
undertaken by Algeria and the United States differ in character, whereas Algerian 
mediation had mainly a communication character, the American was a typical 
manipulation strategy. The overall character of Algeria’s mediation was aimed at 
introducing policies which would enable Algeria to develop and maintain positive 
relations with both antagonists but also empower the weaker party at the dispute- 
Iran, with whom Algeria had closer ideological ties. Algeria’s strategies, such as 
cool screen or face-saver, were particularly useful to temper Iran’s anti-American 
rhetoric, which contributed to more successive communication between 
antagonists but also changed the perception of Iranians in the eyes of Americans 
into a more reliable and more serious partner. The United State’s mediation 
strategy, in its character, had to be carried out very carefully. Any break down in 
talks would integrate the Arab states again and make Egypt more susceptible for 
radicalism and Soviet influence. In addition, America’s reputation in the region 
could have been hurt. Therefore, Kissinger adopted step-by-step diplomacy, 
which aimed at building confidence between adversaries and between adversaries 
and mediator. By using threats and imposing the final solutions, Kissinger could 
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manipulate the mediation process so that the American’s interests were secured 
and would not become the subject of negotiation.  
Both of the parties proved to use their role as information providers 
effectively, which influenced indirectly the mediation outcome. Algerian’s team 
as well as Kissinger could persuade the adversary, in favor which they were 
biased- Iran and Israel, to make concessions by providing information on the 
dangers of mediation failure. As assumed by the Kydd’s model, adversaries made 
concessions only because they trusted that the biased mediator was telling the 
truth. Moreover, the mediator structured the communication between the parties 
in a triad. Negotiations never took place between adversaries. This allowed the 
flow of information between parties to be controlled by the mediator and adequate 
influence for such information in regards to the party’s position.  
 
5.3.3 Outcome 
Both cases of biased mediation appeared to be successful, contrary to general 
wisdom that mediator impartiality is a critical quality for successful mediation. 
Moreover, both successes were achieved due to a mediator’s bias, which in 
accordance with contingency approach affected two contextual factors of current 
conditions of mediation process- information provision and the mediator’s 
strategy. Information provision played a crucial role in two ways: not only could 
the biased mediator more easily persuade the favored party to make concessions, 
but aiming to keep good relations with both of the adversaries, biased mediator 
had to structure the communication in a triad so that the parties’ interests were 
effectively communicated and advocated. In addition, it was the biased mediator’s 
joint interest in both adversaries which affected the choice of strategy that made 
the relations between parties symmetrical. Algeria, although having closer ties to 
Iran and empowering it as a weaker party at dispute, defended America's interests. 
Kissinger, on the other hand, manipulated the process so that the interests of the 
adversaries were balanced.  
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6 Conclusion 
 
International mediation is a multifaceted and dynamic process. The form 
mediation takes is influenced by the specific perceptions, expectations, 
experiences, resources and other conditions that each actor brings into the conflict 
management system. The way the mediating state operates in this system is 
heavily influenced by its simultaneous affiliation to international community 
affecting its relations with adversaries and the perception of a conflict. However, 
to say that a mediator has biases is not to decry its usefulness. Here, this study 
attempted to look beyond descriptions of traditional expectations of a mediator’s 
characteristics and examine the mediator’s bias as a common phenomenon. The 
general aim of this study was to provide an answer to the central question: 
Whether biased mediation can more easily foster success in resolving conflicts? 
Moreover, whether such mediation should be perceived as a natural feature of the 
mediating states operating in the international community?  
With the help of the modified contingency approach, this study proved that, 
although in different settings, and with a mediator of a different leverage, 
strategies adopted and information provided by biased a mediator had the same 
aims and fostered success in both cases. Mediation behavior in that sense, cannot 
be viewed only as a series of independent decisions by mediators. The mediator is 
a conscious player, who structures the process in a way, easiest for him to control 
and to advocate each party’s interests.  
So if the biased mediator can foster success, should its bias be perceived as 
natural and useful? The answer lies in the resemblance found in both analyzed 
cases. Algeria, although not possessing any leverage, shared many similarities 
with United States in the mediation process, as was proved earlier. For a small, 
non-alignment state, such as Algeria, it was as natural for the United States to 
behave in a bias manner and safeguard its own interests. Moreover, neither of the 
countries pretended to be neutral. Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude here that, 
bias is not only a domain of powerful mediators with leverage, but each state 
operating in international community. The states do not exist in a vacuum and 
even the small nations are likely to form a web of interests in any particular 
conflict, which seems to be inevitable. Yet, the competent mediator knows when 
and how to signal its interest, rather then attempting to disavow them. This result 
should lead us to reevaluate the traditional vision of a mediator as disinterested, 
indifferent to the conflict and issues at hand. 
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